[zt]‘07中的新策略及新理论（New Strategies and Theories for '07）

硕鼠

07中的新策略及新理论（New Strategies and Theories for '07）

原作：wwfan

译：jin136 （可能是他吧 ）

目录：1楼  Introduction（导言）

         2楼  Three Philosophies of Tactic-Building（构建战术的三种体系）

         3楼  IntroductionThe ‘Demise’ of the Rule of Two and Slider Apathy（二的规则和滑条互离理论的“退位”）

         4楼后不知道什么原因没有译下去（期待达人中。。。。。。。。 ）


导言


I hope SI forgive me for saying so, but as of yet their arguably unparalleled simulation of football management fails in one respect to live up to the real thing. It is not yet sophisticated enough tactically. I know that some of you who are struggling with the game may sit with gaping mouths when reading this and think my brain has become addled, but I’ll explain.

我希望SI能够原谅我所说的这些，到目前为止他们所说（论证、推广）的举世无双的足球经营游戏在一方面上使得真实性大减。那就是战术方面还不够成熟。我知道你们其中一些在游戏中苦苦挣扎的人在读到以上这些时会张大嘴巴并且认为我脑子坏掉了，但是我一会儿会解释的。

In the modern game of football it is next to impossible to come up with a tactical formation that top clubs boasting experienced managers and quality players are unable to outperform with some degree of consistency. If it could happen then by now a smaller side would have won the Premiership via sheer tactical nous alone. Yet it hasn’t happened and is increasingly unlikely to. Why? Simple. Money and quality always, always outperforms lack of quality. Tactical mistakes from big sides (picking the wrong player for the match, being too attacking, too defensive) may allow a small side to win the odd match, but it won’t happen with regularity. Witness Man Utd’s return to the 4-4-2 that has been the cornerstone of their success and the required ditching of a work-shy goal poacher to accommodate it. Did Ferguson make tactical errors over the last two years? Undoubtedly he did. Did he buy the wrong players? Indisputably. Has he learned from his mistakes? Seems he has. Did Man Utd finish outside the top four in those 4-5-1 days, a position most fans of small clubs would die for? Not once!

在现代足球中，几乎不可能摆出一个比那些拥有值得自豪的富有经验的教练和出色的且一定程度上更团结的球员组成的顶级俱乐部更出色的战术阵型,因为如果能的话，那现在一些小的俱乐部就能够仅通过纯粹的战术理念去赢得英超冠军了。然而这并没有发生且越来越不可能发生。为何这样？很简单。资金和质量两者兼具，总是会比缺乏质量要好。大俱乐部的战术性失误（安排了不合适的球员上场，攻得过猛，过于保守）会使得一些小俱乐部赢得这样一些比赛，但这只是偶尔发生的。目睹曼联回归到那个带给他们成功的且同时为了帮助那个疲软的射手找回状态的4-4-2阵型。是否福格森在最近的两年里有过错误的战术安排？当然有。他是否买了不恰当的球员？无可厚非。他是否从这些失误里吸取了教训？看来是这样。曼联是否在使用了那个置拥有众多球迷的小俱乐部于死地的4-5-1阵型期间进入过前四？从没有过！

The FM tacticians still have a serious advantage over real life managers. They can exploit tactical weaknesses in general terms that don’t exist in the real world. A new system of play can undermine the carefully thought out logic of the game-engine and allow a user team to outperform the AI despite a serious quality gap in personnel. That rarely happens in real life. A team will only get promoted if its squad is among the better squads in the division. Yes, the best team may not win the title and tactical variations can give slight advantages, but they are slight only. Until this version of FM this has not been the case in our virtual world. Many tactics have outperformed the AI in ways that could never happen in real life, with Diablo being the most notable. SI obviously want to eliminate this, as a simulation’s main intention is to successfully mimic real life. So, each version of the game sees a battle between developer and tactical guru, as one tries to build a more and more realistic system of play and the other tries to undermine it with creative tactical innovations. So far, the gurus have always won.

FM游戏的战术家比起现实中教练们有一个巨大的优势。他们能够利用现实中不存在的战术弱点。某种新的战术机制会破坏游戏引擎缜密设计的逻辑，使得玩家那有严重人员缺憾的队伍比AI的更加出色。这在现实中是很少见的。一个队伍只有当球队阵容在联赛中说得上时才能够晋级（有所提高）。不错，最好的队伍未必会赢得冠军且战术的调整能够得到微弱的优势，但毕竟只是微弱的。直到这个版本的FM中这些仍未被当会事儿。许多战术用一些现实中不可能遇到的方式来胜过AI，其中Diablo战术最为著名。很明显SI想要将这种问题克服，仿真的主要意图就是要成功地模仿现实生活。所以，每个版本的游戏都可以看成是开发者与战术大师间的较量，前者试着构建越来越真实的比赛环境，而后者则总试着用富有创造性的战术来破坏它。到目前为止，获胜的总是战术大师们。

Both FM06 and FM07 began their shelf-lives with constant criticism from consumers. ‘The game is too hard’, ‘tactics are too complex’, ‘it’s unrealistic that I can’t get Chelsea to win the title in my first season’ are common complaints. These should read ‘the game is hard because it is more realistic and thus bad user tactics get ripped apart by AI managers that know what they are doing’ and ‘I can’t get Chelsea to win the title in my first season because I’m a newbie manager who really doesn’t know what he is doing which is realistic in the extreme.’ In ’06 the tactical gurus then kicked in and new ways of tactic creation were explained and implemented and the SI forums went quiet. Some of the theories and tactics, as in previous versions, went on to have seminal status. In ’07 these have yet to arrive.

FM06和FM07 自从上市以来就不断遭到消费者的批评。“这个游戏太难了”，“战术太复杂了”，“我选切尔西居然第一个赛季没有夺冠，这不现实”，这些抱怨很常见。其实这些应该这样说，“因为这游戏更真实，因而用户的烂战术被洞悉一切的AI经理完全看穿，所以这个游戏太难了”和“由于我是一个绝对不知道在真正的现实里该干什么的菜鸟教头，所以我选切尔西第一个赛季没有夺冠”。在‘06 的时候，战术大师们解释并做到了用突破的新方式创建战术，SI论坛沉寂了。一些理论和战术在之前的版本里都得到了延续。而现在它们仍延续到了’07里。

Have SI finally defeated the tactical gurus and developed a tactical system that constantly prevents user systems from outperforming the game-engine? I think they are close, but they are not there yet. I’m still performing much better than my player quality would suggest I should, although I haven’t reached the comfort zone I achieved in ’06 in which I could sit back and relax after 10 minutes of a game in 95% security I would get a draw at least. I have to remain focussed all game. But, I believe I am outperforming the game-engine, and am within touching distance of cracking it. I will certainly dominate divisions with players equal to or above the divisional average, which is what we are all trying to do.

SI最终是否会开发出一种不断阻止游戏引擎被超越的战术系统来击败战术大师们？我认为他们就快做到了，但是此时还未做到。虽然我还没有达到在‘06时一场至少能打平的相当保险的比赛进行10分钟后放松休息一下那样，但我的球队仍然表现得比我球员自身能力所应得的要好的多。我需要将将注意力集中在所有比赛上。但是，我相信我超越了比赛引擎，并且就快要破解它了。我必将像大家都想做的那样，用等同或凌驾于联赛水平之上的球员来统治联赛。

The rest of this article/thread discusses the whys and wherefores of tactical methodologies, their strengths and limitations and argues that a whole new mind-set is required when designing tactics in ’07. Finally, it offers the beginnings of some theories and frameworks that will, hopefully, allow users to create solid tactics and reduce their frustrations.

本文接下来将讨论诸多战术理论之所以然，它们的优势和局限性，以及论证有必要在设计‘07的战术时用一个全新的理念。本文最后提供了一些初步的理论框架，将可望帮助用户创造可靠的战术，减少挫折感。

[ 本帖最后由 硕鼠 于 2007-4-21 06:14 PM 编辑 ]

硕鼠

Three Philosophies of Tactic-Building
构建战术的三种体系

There are many individual philosophies concerning tactic building in the T&TT Forum. Some ‘gurus’ prefer highly complex methodologies consisting of tactics for every situations. Others prefer simplified approaches that require little tweaking or adjustment. Others still try to construct weird asymmetrical formations that confuse the AI and take advantage of engine weaknesses. This opening section will analyse the intricacies of the different approaches.

在T&TT论坛上有许多关于构建战术的独立体系。有些“大师”热衷于用非常复杂的方法组成各个情况中的战术。其他一些喜欢进行微调这样简洁的方式。其他一些仍然试着创建怪异的非对称阵型以搞乱AI并利用引擎的弱点。本章一开始将分析这些错综复杂的不同流派。

Complex
复杂流
I would be regarded as a ‘complex guru’. My tactics and threads take into consideration the minutiae of the tactical settings and require considerable building and setting up before game-play begins. I demand individual mentality settings for each player and different home and away settings for individuals and the team as a whole. My theories have been criticised as being too anal and determent on constant minor tweaks before coming to fruition.

我可能称得上“复杂流大师”。我的战术和思路会在比赛开始前就考虑到复杂的战术设定并且需要相当多的构造和设定。我要求每位球员有单独的心态设置以及个人和球队的主客场不同设置。我的理论被挑剔为过于追求细节以至于妨碍了理论自我逐步完善,最终达到成熟的过程.

These criticisms have always rankled. My own take on my approach is that I try to build a logical mentality framework that can be adjusted to suit any formation, within which individual settings can be manipulated to produce the required results. The framework I devised in ’06 did that exceptionally well and allowed me, towards the end of 06’s shelf-life, to be able to showboat, switching between formations as and when I pleased with no detrimental affect on performance. The football was fluid and effective, capable of scoring goals and keeping things tight defensively. At no point did I believe it was over complex or reliant on slight slider tweaks. The mentality framework was logical, as were the home and away settings, and I rarely thought about minor slider adjustments. Once it was right, it was right.

这些吹毛求疵的意见总是让人觉得气愤。我试图用我自己方式建立一个可以调整到适合任何阵型的一个符合逻辑的心态框架，它可以采用个人的设置来达到所需要的结果。我设计出的‘06框架直到’06成为过去，它一直表现得相当出色，在不同阵型间切换也能有着不错的表现，我对此表示满意。用它能踢出流畅和让人印象深刻的比赛，并且能在不乏进球的同时保持严密的防守。我从来都不认为这有多么复杂或是需要去微调滑动条。这样的心态框架是符合逻辑的，主客场设置都很好，而我从来不考虑去进行微调，只要它正确过一次，那它就是正确的。

Yet, I became a victim of my own success. Within 10 minutes of any game I would be able to see if my chosen tactical-flavour was the right one and either leave the game to run, or switch to another system before the opposition had too many chances and win the match in the second half. I only lost 5 or 6 games in total in all competitions over my last four seasons. My interest waned as the game became too easy and I began to play half-heartedly. Although it is fun winning there does need to be a challenge. When ’07 came out I hoped it would answer said challenge and it has not disappointed. I will further this discussion later in the ‘Demise’ of the Rule of Two.

然而，我成了自己成功的牺牲品。 我只看所有比赛的前10分钟，如果我是一开始用的战术就是正确的，或者在对手拥有太多机会之前我换到另外的一个能够在下半场制胜的正确战术时，我就不再去管它了。在我最后4个赛季里我总共丢掉的比赛只有5、6场。当游戏变得这样简单我就开始失去兴趣并且开始敷衍了事了。虽然胜利是很快乐但我需要有一个新的挑战。当‘07出来的时候我希望它能够带给我这样的新挑战，它没有让我失望。这我会在稍后的二的规则的“退位”中详说的。
Simple
简单流


The archetypal ‘simple’ approach is the Slider Apathy favoured by Asmodeus. It is based (or was based in ’06) on a dual mentality setting which linked strikers to defenders by use of a high defensive line. This enabled the team to remain compact whilst ensuring five players defended and five attacked at all times. Other settings were left to user preference as to their judgement of player ability. It produced a different style of play than the Rule of Two system I was using, but was equally effective. Unlike myself, Asmodeus has never been accused of over-complexity and his ideas and system, although theoretically and intellectually sound, offered effective tactics for the more casual game-player. Like myself, Asmodeus built tactics that out-performed the game engine (and here’s the rub, to be discussed later).

典型的“简单流”就是Asmodeus（另一位比较著名的FM玩家）所钟爱的滑条互离原则（注：Slider Apathy，之前有人将此解释为分裂原则，原意是滑条冷漠，意思就是特定的两个滑条不应该在同一位置）。它以后防线前压从而使得有两种心态设置的前锋与后卫之间联系起来为基础理论（或许它只构建在‘06中）。这样它能够在保证队形紧凑的同时总是让5名球员负责防守而另外五名负责进攻。其他设置用户可能根据球员的能力进行设置。这样就产生了一种和我是用的二的规则所不同的风格，但同样有效。不像我，Asmodeus的想法和体系虽然被炒得沸沸扬扬，但从未被指责为太复杂，许多不求甚解的玩家用它们做出了有效的战术。和我一样，Asmodeus构建的战术超越了游戏引擎（就此打住，稍候再讨论）。

Asymmetrical
非对称流

The asymmetrical ‘gurus’ build tactics that rely on formations that would be unthinkable in real-life football. Four-three-threes with weird side-arrows are the most common variant but there are others. I would also place Diablo, with its long-farrowed MC, in this category even though it is not asymmetrical, as a midfielder constantly sprinting half the length of the pitch to become an auxiliary centre-forward is highly unrealistic. These tactics all work(ed) because they challenged the logistics of the game-engine and took advantage of scenarios unimagined by the programmers. Another example of the AI failing to deal with unrealistic tactical plans is the ‘everyone at the back post’ corner routine which warped any testing of ’06 tactics as it guaranteed too many goals from set-pieces.

非对称流的“大师”用在现实中不可能实现的阵型来构建战术。边路拉出奇怪箭头的4-3-3阵型是最常见的，但他们不是这样做。这我就要提到Diablo阵型了，阵型里有一个长途奔袭的MC，这样子的话虽然它是对称的，但一个中场坚持不懈的飞奔过半个球场去充当一个前锋是相当不现实的。之所以这类的阵型有些奇效是因为违反了游戏引擎的逻辑并利用了程序员们预先没有想到的设计漏洞。另一个造成AI不知所措的不现实战术就是扭曲了所有‘06战术测试的“要求所有人在后点”角球战术（BT角球）的定位球高进球率。

It is easy to write off the asymmetrical tactical gurus as game-engine hackers who search for bugs and errors within the engine and exploit them. Their tactics have little to do with real football and a lot to do with the difficulties of programming a football simulation that can cope with unrealistic and unexpected systems of play. These tactics have their place, as they will help SI develop an understanding of where their game-engine holes are located so they can fill them. They are also the result of highly creative thinking and analysis and should be commended. However, that doesn’t stop me from hoping that they all fail. Once asymmetrical tactics fail to out-perform the engine then a greater level of realism will have been reached than ever before. I think ’07 may well have reached this plateau.

很容易一口气就写出像游戏引擎破解者一样的非对称流战术大师们是如何找寻并利用游戏引擎的漏洞的。他们的战术中利用太多由于仿真足球游戏编写过程中还不能及的真实性和意外性，利用的真正足球理念却微乎其微。他们的战术也有自身价值，那就是它们会帮助SI去了解并修补它们的游戏引擎存在问题的地方。值得称道的地方是它们是高创造力及高分析能力的结晶。 但是，这些仍不能阻止我希望他们统统失败。当非对称流无法再超越游戏引擎的时候，那种真实性将是前所未有的了。我相信‘07可能会达到这样的水平。

Before I am attacked by the asymmetrical gurus, I wish to state here and now that I also regard my and Asmodeus’s systems as ones that took advantage of inadequacies in the game-engine and should be as equally open to criticism as asymmetrical tactics. The following section will explain why I have come to think this way.

在我被非对称流大师们围攻之前，我此刻想声明，我把我的战术于Asmodeus的战术一样去看待，因为我们的战术都从游戏引擎上或多或少获得利益，所以也应该接受非对称流战术的批评。

硕鼠

The ‘Demise’ of the Rule of Two and Slider Apathy
二的规则和滑条互离理论的“退位”

Demise is too strong a word. The Rule of Two still works and, judging from Asmodeus’s New Year resurrection of Slider Apathy, so do his theories. However, they are seriously challenged by the new engine and nowhere near as effective as before. Rule of Two still over-performs in terms of results but not in terms of possession, chance creation and fluidity of play. It would be relatively easy to remain on the Rule of Two bandwagon and still do quite well. But ‘well’ is not enough. I want to be able to dominate possession, play pretty football, score well worked goals and win in some style and the Rule of Two does not do this. I’ll try to explain why and how I think its dominance has been challenged.

退位这个词太沉重了。2的规则依旧有用，从Asmodeus滑条互离理论在新年的复苏看来，他的理论也还有用。然而，它们在新引擎下受到严重制约，使得它们远不及以前的效果。二的规则从比赛的结果上来说依旧能超越（游戏引擎），但控球率、机会的创造、流畅度却不能是这样了。要保留二的规则的余热是相对简单的况且它仍然表现得还不错。但仅仅“不错”是不够的。我想要主宰控球率，踢出漂亮的足球，精彩配合后进球以及用一些二的规则所不能做到的方式去赢球。我一会儿会解释为何我会觉得这些支配欲受到挑战以及我是如何想的。Defensive Line and Mentality
后防线及心态

Arguably, the reprogramming of the defensive line and increased mentality differentials have been the undoing of both the Rule of Two and dual mentality frameworks. In ’06 employing a high defensive line kept both types of formation tight and allowed for solid defence and fluid attack. The user had the best of both worlds. His team could be both defensive and attacking at the same time. The game-engine couldn’t cope with this and both systems out-performed to a huge degree. In this respect they are no different to the asymmetrical tactics I challenged before, with the exception that they were built on logical frames that the game designers hadn’t foreseen, rather than exploiting holes and gaps with weird arrows and positions.

将后防线系统及不同心态差别的程序重写，这对2的规则和双重心态框架来说无疑是毁灭性的。在’06中利用前压的后防线能使得阵型紧凑以造就坚固的防守和流畅的进攻。玩家们鱼和熊掌兼得了。他的队伍能够在防守的同时去进攻。游戏引擎不能应付这样的情况所以使得引擎的防守和进攻体系都被大大的逾越。出于以上几些，除却它们是构建于游戏设计者没有预见到的逻辑框架之上的这点要强过凭借怪异的箭头和位置去利用漏洞的做法之外，这类战术和我之前所鄙视的非对称流战术没有区别。

The reworking of the defensive line, so that it only kicks in when a team loses possession, is one of the key elements that have forced an alteration of approach for the tactical gurus. Any formation that relies on heavily split mentalities will struggle with the gaps in and behind the defence that a high line leaves with low mentality defenders or a low line leaves with high mentality midfielders. The defence retreats more quickly than the midfield so there is too little cover in front of it and the defenders becomes horribly exposed. This affect is minimised by working out the average mentality for the team and then giving the defensive line the same slider setting, but this still fails to combat the other main issue of heavily split mentalities, which is player confusion.

后防线系统的重写使得它只在球队失去球权的时候起作用，这是迫使战术大师们改变套路的     主要因素之一。任何心态设置差别过大的阵型都是会面临一个问题，那就是低心态后卫加上后防线前压或者是高心态中场加上后防线收缩时其防线上的或者是身后的漏洞。后防线撤退的会比中场线快的多，所以这样就会让使得后防线得到机少的掩护，以至于防守球员直接被暴露在对方面前。 计算出球队的平均心态然后将后防线滑动条设置到相同的值便能够将此影响降到最低，但是这样仍不能解决心态设置差别过大带来的另外一个主要问题，那就是球员的混乱。


Mentality has been reworked so that on field mentality differences are more acute than previously. Thus, a heavy mentality split will produce a loose formation that offers a lot of space that a tight, (near) global mentality system then exploits. This weakness of this type of tactic is accentuated by player confusion as to where they should be passing. A player with a low mentality is unlikely to play a risky ball to a high mentality player up the pitch and instead will pass to a player with similar mentality settings, which leads to lots of aimless passes between the back four and a defensive mentality midfielder. Eventually possession is lost as the opposition closes them down and the team is under pressure. The risk of such play is minimised by employing defensive midfielders who sit in front of the back four and protect it from counters whilst still being high mentality enough to launch attacks of their own. The best Rule of Two tactical set I have seen employs one or two defensive midfielders in all its flavours. However, it seems next to impossible to build a fluent 4-4-2 using the Rule of Two framework.

心态系统被重写了，所以较以前，场上的心态区别更加明显。因而，心态设置差别过大将造就一个会被使用（接近）全局心态设置的紧凑战术系统所利用，拥有许多空档的松散阵型。球员对于往哪儿传球的混乱会使得这个战术之前的缺陷被放大。一个低心态的球员通常不会传出一记威胁球去给场上高心态的球员，取而代之的是把球传给拥有近似心态的球员，这样就会造成后场的四个人和一个司职防守的中场球员间无目的地传来传去。最终由于对手的逼抢而失去球权，从而使球队面临压力。将此类风险降到最低的方法是将一名高心态的防守型中场放在后场四个人之前，这样在保护自己半场的同时仍能发动进攻。我曾见过最好的基于2的规则的战术就在其中布置了一到两个后腰。

Width
宽度

Although not as influential as the defensive line and mentality, width has also been reworked in ’07 and requires a different outlook. In ’06, to get the full-backs into space to cross and defeat the 3-3-2-1-1 you were required to give them short-farrows. In ’07 as long as you have a normal width and mixed forward runs on the full-backs they will overlap and support the attack. As goals per game have decreased dramatically, overlapping full-backs are necessary to defeat tight AI formations and they only do so with low split mentalities and a reasonably wide formation.

虽然不及后防线系统和心态系统的影响力，但它在’07中同样被重写，并且需要重新审视了。在’06中，想要凭借让边后卫前插去传中来战胜3-3-2-1-1阵型时，你需要给他们拉一个向前的短箭头。在’07中只要将宽度设置到普通，同时设置边后卫的前插为混合，他们就会交替地去参与进攻。当进球明显一场比一场少时，常无功而返的边后卫们只能通过差别较低的心态设置和宽度合适的阵形去战胜AI那紧密的阵型。


Conclusion
结论


Both the Rule of Two and Slider Apathy theories took advantage of game-engine weaknesses, albeit in a logical manner, that the developers hadn’t foreseen. As in previous generations of FM, these weaknesses have been largely wiped out by reworking the engine, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Neither of them are toothless but they are more frustrating than in ’06 and both almost certainly require DMCs to function. Neither will adapt comfortably to the most common formation in football, the 4-4-2, and therefore their validity must be questioned. Hence, a strategic rethink is required.

2的规则和滑条互离理论都是去利用游戏引擎的缺陷，尽管合乎逻辑，但是是开发者所没有预想到的。在前几代的FM中，这些缺陷通过重写游戏引擎被清除，因此它们的作用被减小。虽然它们还尚存一丝气息，但相对’06来说它们的作用被严重的削弱了，并且几乎都一定要用后腰来让它们起效。它们都不能平稳地转换到足球中最普及的4-4-2阵容，因此它们的有效性值得怀疑。因此，有必要进行战略上的反思。

Apologies to Asmodeus if his Slider Apathy is working as well as it was in ’06. According to his posts and my assumptions it shouldn’t be, but I haven‘t tried it and am basing my arguments on observation of the match engine and his own comments on the validity of his theory

如果滑条互离理论还像在’06中一样有效的话，那么我在这向Asmodeus道歉。结合他的帖子和我的假设看来这理论不再有用了，但我并没有去试验，而是我通过对比赛引擎观察后的结论以及他自己关于他理论有效性的评论。

硕鼠

Rethinking Strategy

As I stated previously, my Rule of Two tactics were overachieving in terms of results, but not in terms of style. My original post in ’06 suggested that the match engine was flawed and that it was impossible to make a decent 4-4-2. I disproved my own argument over a period of intense experimentation and constructed a solid 4-4-2 which eventually evolved into a diamond. It became more complex as I began to better understand the game and resulted in the Tactical Theorems and Frameworks thread that ran to three incarnations prior to this one. Hopefully, this thread will be as popular and useful as its predecessors.

Unfortunately, or fortunately in real terms as my life is considerably more fun and interesting than it was in late 2005, I don’t have as much time to devote to Football Manager as I did. Come January 2007 I am only 9 matches in to my 5th season. Therefore, I don’t have as much time to experiment with tactics as I did previously and thus my approach has been different. In ’06 I downloaded and rejected a series of so-called super tactics before embarking on a mission to design a logical framework. This required a huge amount of testing and game-play. For ’07, much of this testing has been carried out by others (Supersaint, El Padre, crazy gra, Beevster, The New Diaby, thegooner spring to mind) and for that I thank them. From their writings and observations I was able to build a reasonably complex theoretical picture of how the game worked which allowed me to circumnavigate a lot of the testing. The following is a rough guide to my thought processes in terms of re-imagining tactical excellence in ’07. As in ’06, I was working entirely towards producing a solid 4-4-2 that could perform above the ability of the AI. Also, as in ’06 my testing team was a team that had been promoted to a Regional Conference division the previous season (Maidenhead in ’06, Blyth in ’07), so was low in terms of quality.

For a long time I remained trapped in the Rule of Two approach to mentality. I adjusted many tactical elements of the game in trying to get RoT working well. All of them failed on one count. I could get results but not the performance I wanted. Possession was low, shot count was low. The one thing that stood in its favour, and the element that SI has still failed to resolve in dealing with heavy split mentality systems, was the percentage of goals scored per shot on target. Rule of Two still guarantees a few really good chances every game as the high mentality split forces the odd overload of the AI’s defence, but it happens with much less frequency than in ’06. Eventually, I became frustrated with the system (exactly paralleling my experiences in ’06 as I gained promotion in the play-offs first season but wasn’t happy with playing style) and began to play around with different mentality settings.

For a while I played around with the Ro3, in which each stratum of the team (defence, midfield, attack) operated on the same mentality split by three from the stratum above it. Thus, defence would be 6, midfield 9, attack 12. However, there were no perceivable benefits and I scrapped it. I also experimented with Supersaint’s take on the Rule of Two in which attacking systems would start with the central defence on 10 and defensive ones with the central defence on 2 with adjusted defensive line and closing down for each system. There was some improvement, but not to the extent I wished. At this stage I began to get frustrated and played around with global mentalities and slightly split mentalities, but I still couldn’t get things working the way I wanted. Finally, as I was about to permanently dent my forehead from constantly bashing it on a wall, I came across a thread offering a different perspective.

I hope he won’t mind me saying this, but the majority of this user’s threads and comments are less than sophisticated and generally limited in their worth. This one, however, offered me the building blocks for a series of mentality frameworks that finally got my team performing in the manner I wanted. Titled simply ‘Experiment’, this thread by PAGEY124 revolutionised my thinking, and were it not for its existence I doubt I would be writing this thread right now. Implementing its mentality settings, although not his other suggestions, immediately produced the requisite quality change in playing style and the mentality frameworks I had been searching for.

As in ’06, once I had a mentality framework I was happy with, it became relatively easy to build a decent 4-4-2. I tend to build from defence, first concentrating on preventing goals and then scoring them. As soon as I implemented the new mentality frameworks my defence tightened immeasurably. Indeed, my early versions of the tactics were so defensively sound I only conceded through defensive errors (exasperating but something you have to live with) or via set-pieces. I was conceding circa 0.3 a game which is a decent record when you are predicted to come 17th in the Conference National. Unfortunately, I wasn’t scoring many goals, with most matches being 1-0, 0-1, 1-1 or 0-0. I was happy with that short-term but needed to improve the attacking variations and quality in order to be entirely satisfied. I won the Conference by 3 points and readied myself for further experimentation the next season.

In my RoT tactics in the first two seasons of ‘07 I used a tall target man who was undisputedly my best player in terms of performance if not attributes. I had stopped using one after he retired but felt that as it was so effective in the Conference North it should be equally effective with a slightly better target man in L2 (two promotions in three seasons), so I splashed out my first significant outlay (16 grand) on a target man who had been solid if unspectacular in the Conference National to see if I could get him working in L2. Initially, I used balls to head to get him winning flick-ons to the left-winger and the other centre-forward, but they were failing due to my short passing system. In order to get more out of him I switched to direct passing for my defenders, and shortly afterwards mixed for my central midfielders, and he exploded into life. My goal-scoring rocketed (in relative terms) from being less than 1 a game to circa 1.7 a game by the end of the season. This may not sound like much but was in the top three performers in the division, with my defensive record being far and away the best.

I now had a system I was reasonably satisfied with. It was defensively solid, offered enough chances both home and away to grab wins or draws in most matches, and the target man was the form player in the division. Player weakness (I was predicted to come 24th) stopped it from being all it could be, but I ended up winning the division by circa 20 points. It was a little one-dimensional, but ready for upload. I tested it out with a supporting thread in another forum and after a few good responses linked to it in Tactical Theorems and Frameworks to see how it fared. Again, the reaction was positive. Another user whose opinion I trust implicitly (The Next Diaby) has also reworked the framework into a diamond and pronounced it equally valid in that formation. I have since tweaked it some more, but the basic settings remain. So, after a long journey, often paved with jagged stones, I am ready to write a new set of Theorems and Frameworks, which takes me up to this thread and my next heading.

硕鼠

Theorems and Frameworks ‘07


Frameworks

The aim of Tactical Theorems and Frameworks has always been to provide a systematic approach to tactical building that users can apply across the board, no matter what team or what level. The following is no different and a logical and systematic application of the frameworks described below and related theories should guarantee quality performance. As in previous renditions, the framework section focuses entirely on mentality settings, whereas the theorems section deals with all other aspects of tactic design. The frameworks below are no longer based on the Rule of Two and, for simplicity’s sake, will be known as the Rule of One. With luck they will produce the same level of user performance in ’07 as the Rule of Two framework did in ’06.

As mentioned before, I am not refuting the validity of the Rule of Two or Slider Apathy frameworks in totality; rather I am suggesting they require DMCs (and possibly AMCs) to function and are thus unable to meet the requirements of the 4-4-2 formation. They definitely require multi-strata formations of some kind in order to reach the effectiveness level of ’06. As the 4-4-2 is the cornerstone formation of modern football (1966-2000) a new framework is required. Alternate, super-modern formations, such as Benitez’s 4-2-3-1 or Mourinho’s 4-5-1/4-3-3, should still lend themselves to RoT or SA as they both use DMCs.

In advocating new frameworks for the 4-4-2, I am being forced to switch to multi-flavoured tactics for a variety of home and away situations. User intuition will then decide on which framework to implement for which situation. Inevitably, some user choices will be wrong and performance will suffer. This cannot be avoided and is part and parcel of the trials and tribulations of real and virtual management. Some of the side effects of bad choice making can be negated through other tactical elements, which will be theorised later. However, user error must be kept in mind when applying the following frameworks and in-match flexibility and adjustment is a necessity.

The key to building a successful mentality framework is to envision the system that the AI will use and implement a tactic that first negates and then outperforms it. In designing my current set of frameworks I followed the basic premise that stopping the other team scoring guaranteed a level of performance from which I could experiment in terms of attacking strategy. After eliminating the vagaries of performance due to excellent or poor man-management I wanted to have a set of tactics that offered me the possibility of winning in every match. This is not to say that I would or could win every match. It is sufficient to be equal or above AI performance in terms of match stats in general terms. If each match guarantees a level of performance that offers a chance of victory, then a combination of quality man-management, good play and luck will result in a winning record. Matches you should have lost will transform into draws, and draws become wins. Once that plateau is reached, consistent performance becomes more related to media and player management and matches lost due to poor tactical implementation become few and far between.


Home Framework

The home framework may seem on face evidence overly attacking and unrealistic. Both central defenders are given attacking mentalities, which would seem to be unusual instructions for the position. But, what it does is ensure that the defence, in a match in which the tactic is effective, concentrates 75% of its energies supporting the attack and only 25% on defending. If the team is playing to form then that statistic is acceptable, as a home team should be looking to attack considerably more often than defend. However, if the team is having a bad day then the user manager should adjust the formation to provide more defensive stability before trying to buck the troops up at half-time.

The home framework offers solid performance levels as long as the team is playing equal or above its quality level. The odd occasion in which they fall below this level will require some tactical adjustments and quality man-management at half-time. Ideally, the user manager will realise his team is below par early enough in the half to switch to a more defensively sound formation and thus minimise any damage. Early indicators for team performance are possession and pass percentage. Although neither really stabilises until the 10th minute, an advantage for the AI after this point in either or both stats is an indication that you have either got your tactics wrong or that the team is performing below expectations.

The home framework mentality ensures that the team is looking to attack more often than not. It will force players to take attacking risks and forwards to have a shoot on sight mentality. It will fall down heavily against sides of a higher level that will destroy it on the counter, but, in my experience, that only happens against teams operating in higher divisions.

Mentality

GK 14
DC 15
FB 16
MCd 17
ML/R 18
MCa 19
FC 20

There is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.

硕鼠

Away Framework

The basic away framework operates as a negative copy of the home framework. In opposition to the home framework, it concentrates entirely on defending. Assuming that the home side is focusing on attacking moves >75% of the time, a tactic that has eight of its eleven players focused on defending to greater degree should provide some stability. As three players are, although still defensive, looking to attack above 25% of the time there should be some attacking potential on the counter-attack. It primarily focuses on stopping the opposition playing and only looks to score from lightening raids and set pieces.

As for the home tactic, indicators of performance are possession and pass percentage. Unlike the home tactic, in which you should be seeing a relative advantage for your team, matching AI performance, you should be looking to match the AI in both areas. Possession should ideally hover around 50% but this can’t be guaranteed for away tactics. As long as it isn’t falling below 47% you should be relatively happy. Pass percentage is a more solid indicator of performance away and you should see your team dominate in this area. However, if you are achieving over 50% possession, pass percentage importance decreases.

Mentality

GK 1
DC 2
FB 3
MCd 4
ML/R 5
MCa 6
FC 7

There is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.

And there my frameworks would have ended had I finished writing the article the same day I started it. However, there has been a time delay, during which time I have discovered some limitations of the away framework. Before discussing them and an alternate framework to combat them, it is necessary to turn our attention to the intricacies of re-ranking and match odds to offer some reasoning behind the limitations.


Re-Ranking and Pre-Match Odds

I previously wrote that re-ranking was happening on a match-by-match basis and this constituted a greater level of sophistication in AI responses to user performance. I will now refute that in returning to my original position that re-ranking occurs mid-season (in a minor form) and with greater degree at the end of season. The pre-match odds are an indicator of recent form. The combination of the two will suggest how the AI will line up against you.

In my most recently completed season I was the bookmakers’ favourite for relegation, being predicted to come 24th with odds of 80-1 to be champions. Not surprisingly, this meant that all of the AI teams expected to beat me when I played away against them. Naturally, I consistently came up against attacking formations. Early season odds had the AI team as heavy favourite for my away games, with my home games being close calls either way. In the away games the ultra-defensive mentality of the Away Framework negated the heavy attacking strategy of the AI and I performed pretty consistently away from home. If the AI scored first I was in trouble, but if I could frustrate them for the first hour I would usually sneak a one or two-nil victory.

This tactic had also worked effectively the previous season when I had also been predicted to come 24th (in L2) and had walked the division, losing three games in total. In L1 it was less effective as player for player I was often out-matched, but my away record was pretty solid. I had a major injury crisis mid-season (four goalies and three centre forwards out simultaneously is tough to cover for a small club with few resources), which knocked me down from challenging for the title to mid-table. I regained form as my players returned to fitness and ended up in a play-off spot, finishing only 3 points away from automatic promotion. I was two minutes away from going up in the play-off final when, out of the blue, as I had seen no chances against for 10 minutes, the AI equalised and went on to win in the penalty shoot-out. The whole season ruined in the space of a few short minutes!

But, with every cloud comes a silver lining. I strengthened the squad and readied myself for a serious crack at the title. I was pretty confident that I would dominate the division as my player quality had improved dramatically. My pre-season odds were 8-1, and all the away games were short-odds either way. Sorted, or so I thought. It was then a wrecking ball smashed my illusory self-confidence to smithereens. My away performances had only needed to shift in level slightly for me to pick up the extra few points I needed for automatic promotion. As I had a much better first eleven I was sure they would do. However, in the away games I was getting pounded. I barely managed a shot on goal. The opposition dominated me. Something was seriously wrong.

The AI was now playing less aggressively against me. Previously, I had played my ultra-conservative tactics against high mentality / high defensive line systems and undid them through committed defence and lightening breaks. However, as the AI was now playing more conservatively against me, my through balls to the breaking forwards were now being intercepted by the deeper lying defenders and recycled back to the AI attack. I held out for a couple of draws due to magnificent performances from my centre-backs and keeper, but I was never going to win any away games this way. A rethink was required.

I had already designed an alternate away tactic for the theoretical games in which I would be the favourite despite not being at home. Due to my poor pre-season ranking this had rarely happened (twice only) so I hadn’t really tested it. However, logically it should work as it followed my defensive theories in order to remain defensively sound, but increased mentalities throughout the team. I implemented it for my next few away games to give it an extended run out. The result was outstanding. Since the shift in mentalities I have won all bar one away game (which was a cup game against higher level opposition). Had I not shifted I would have been average the first half of the season before the AI teams decided I was cannon fodder away, at which time my successful strategy would reinsert itself as the AI began to attack me again. If I hadn’t come to terms with the tactical switch required early in the season, a serious bout of frustration would have ensued. I’m sure one or two FMers have experienced the scenario of over-performing, strengthening the squad pre-season before crashing and burning without realising why. Fortunately, I reacted quickly enough to minimise the morale damage the away performances would bring and, with the new tactical plan in operation, embarked on the successful run I had envisioned pre-season.


Attacking Away Framework

Although most settings are unchanged from the Away Framework, the mentality switch ensures a more aggressive performance without compromising too much on defensive stability. As this framework should be employed on short-odds away games in which the AI can be assumed to play a conservative attacking game, the defensive compromise should be negligible. At the same time, the forwards will be operating further up the pitch which will place the deeper defensive line employed by the AI under more pressure than the away tactic. Simply, the mentality framework places the last line of defence, the centre-backs, on same mentality as the first line of attack in the Away Framework.

Mentality

GK 6
DC 7
FB 8
MCd 9
ML/R 10
MCa 11
FC 12

As for the previous frameworks, there is a set of theories complementing this mentality framework that will be discussed later.


A Hypothetical Framework

It may be that these three frameworks offer all that is required to defeat the various permutations of AI tactics. However, as I am yet to reach the higher echelons of the game, I am not certain if even the attacking away framework will suffice when your team is all conquering. This level of performance may well require a final, fourth framework to outperform AI teams that play semi-defensive formations at home. The hypothesized framework is based on the assumption that the attacking stratum, the forwards, should operate on the same mentality as the most defensive stratum of the Home Framework.

Mentality

GK 9
DC 10
FB 11
MCd 12
ML/R 13
MCa 14
FC 15


It is interesting to note that no secondary home framework seems to be required. Even with a team predicted to come dead last, the Home Framework outperforms the AI tactics. The only issue with it is its lack of cutting edge against weak teams that park a bus in front of the goal, but again, these issues can be minimised by applying certain attacking theories.

硕鼠

Theorems


Passing, Width & Tempo

These three settings are intrinsically related and are vital to get right when designing tactics. If you have lots of short passing in an ultra wide formation, passes will be constantly under hit and the opposition will frequently intercept the ball mid-move and counter. Likewise, long balls and a narrow formation will reduce possession percentages as the only option for most players will be a pump up to the FC who will be surrounded by both his own team and the opposition as players are so close together, so his flick ons are likely to be very ineffective. Although you can play a quick tempo with short passing you need highly technical players to do this, and as technique stats seem to have reduced considerably since ’06, you will require a world-class side to pull it off.

If you watch quality teams play in real life, you will notice that it is the central midfield that sets the tempo. Think Viera with Arsenal, Keane with Man Utd. When Keane was at his peak, his quick winning of the ball, bringing it forward from defence and pinging counter-attacking balls forward to the breaking midfielders was the fulcrum off the team. When Veron joined, his slower playmaking style disrupted the team and results fell away. As in real life, when designing your tactics link the tempo and width with your MCs’ passing.

Basically, set the MCs’ passing to whatever passing style you would like your team to play, be it a continentalesque 5, a very Premiership 10, or a LLM 15. Adjust the team width and tempo sliders to match. Then, adjust the passing of the players operating behind the MCs (central defenders, full-backs and goalkeeper) to be slightly (2-5 clicks) longer than the MCs, and the players operating higher up the pitch (wingers and forwards) to be slightly shorter (2-5 clicks).

The logic of this system is based around the position players take on the pitch and how close players are to them when they have the ball. In general, defenders, when in possession and under little pressure, are further away from their nearest player than midfielders or attacker are. So a more direct passing style is more viable. Employing such a style also offers them more passing options, as a direct through ball could find a breaking winger and set a one-pass attacking move in motion. However, when an attacking player is in possession, he is, unless on a quick break, likely to be surrounded by team mates who are all operating in a small zone of the pitch. Short, intricate passing is needed in such situations for moves to succeed.


Defensive Line

The defensive line links heavily with whatever mentality framework you have chosen. Defender attributes, specifically pace and positioning, will allow for some level of line adjustment but I would advise not placing the defensive line in a position that unlinks it from the framework. Simply put, the defensive line should be placed at mid-point of the framework mentality. Thus, if you have chosen to implement the attacking framework, with player mentalities ranging from 14-20, you would position the defensive line at midpoint between the two (17). If you have chosen the heavily defensive away formation (1-7), you would set the defensive line at four.

If you have quick defenders who have good positioning stats you could happily place the defensive line higher than the mid-point of the mentality framework in confidence that their pace and ability to read the game will allow them to cover any counter-attacks over the top with relative ease. However, if they are slower than average, then dropping the d-line back slightly will allow them to cover quick attackers without becoming over exposed to balls over their heads into the space behind them.


Closing Down

Defenders

Although I appreciated supersaint’s experiments on mirroring closing down with the defensive line, unfortunately my final conclusion is that I don’t agree with him. His matching of the defensive line to average mentality, as explained above, is exemplary and a cornerstone of the theorems, but in my opinion, quality defending relies on low closing down (3-5). Low closing down defenders hold their position and thus require the attacker to do something special to get past them. If they close down heavily, they may well reduce space for the player on the ball, but they also leave space behind them that can be too easily exploited for my liking. Therefore, for both home and away frameworks, I keep closing down low for the defence.

Central Midfielders

Midfielders’ closing down is the only closing down instruction I regulate heavily through the frameworks. Like the defensive line, their closing down links to the framework I have selected. Thus, in the high mentality home framework, they close down to the same setting as the defensive line (17), whereas in the away framework they only close down to four. The logic behind this is that in the home framework they will be high up the pitch most of the time, so heavy closing down is likely to win the ball in or near the opposition’s half, which will be dangerous for them. If they fail to win the ball there is little damage done to the user team, as the defence are still reasonably high up the pitch and should cover any through ball/attacking move. However, in the defensive framework, high closing down for midfielders will be taking place in front of their own penalty area which is exceedingly dangerous should they miss the tackle. So, I prefer them to hold position with low closing down, which forces the AI players to try something, rather than offering them space if my player makes a mistake.

DMCs

If employing a DMC you will need to play higher closing down than if you employ pure MCs. If you follow the above guide, the DMC will be dragged into the defensive line and provide no cover. Therefore, he should be closing down reasonably heavily in front of the defensive line to offer the protection you are looking for.


Attackers and Wingers

One of the common user complaints in FM07 is the difficulty of defending deep crosses or balls over the top of the defence. Getting the closing down settings for the forwards and wingers correct seems to counter this. The key, certainly in away formations, is to close down heavily and have easy tackling. This gets your players in position to challenge the AI player in possession, but not to tackle him, unless the tackle is obviously ‘on’. However, you put him under enough pressure to ensure he can’t hit comfortable through balls or quality crosses into the box, as the forward or winger is blocking the ball. Since I employed these settings I have hardly ever conceded a goal from deep passes or crosses.


Marking

Home Tactics

It is important to tight mark with the defence to reduce space for opposition attackers. As man-marking has finally been fixed (7.0.1), I prefer to man mark the opposition with the defence, although tight zonal should work equally well. The rest of the team generally focuses on attacking, so to ensure they are often in space, loose zonal marking seems to be the best option.

Away Tactics

For the away tactics I recommend tight man-marking across the board for midfield and defence, as it is the best way to reduce space for the opposition. The forwards should remain loose marking though so they are available to pick up pressure relieving balls from the defence.


Tackling

Home Tactics

One of the simplest settings in the game, I have everybody on normal tackling. I want the team to contest balls all over the pitch, but generally rely on my heavy pressing midfield and attack to force the opposition to play quicker balls than they would wish to regain possession.

Away Tactics

Here, things are a little more complex. I would suggest a combination of easy, hard and normal. The only normal tacklers are the central defenders and the goalkeeper. This is because most tackles they make are likely to be in the penalty area and hard tackling gives away too many dead ball situations, so penalties will become commonplace. However, as the midfield and full-backs should normally be outside the box, I have them on heavy tackling. I would rather give away a free kick with a heavy challenge outside the box than allow opposing midfielders to opportunity to outmuscle my midfield and play uncontested passes towards a deep defensive line. Finally, the wingers and forwards are on easy tackling, as their job is to block deep passes and crosses into the area. I don’t want to risk them missing tackles and allowing uncontested balls in, rather I want them to hold their positions and make things as difficult as possible for the AI player in possession.

硕鼠

Forward Runs

The way forward runs works is a key change in the match engine between 06 and 07. In 06, leaving your forwards on high forward runs was fundamental to their settings and guaranteed a lot of goals. Now, all it guarantees is a lot of offsides. The best settings for forward runs seem to be, and I’m happy to be challenged on this, as follows:

GK: Rarely
DC: Rarely
FB: Mixed at home, Rarely away
MCd: Rarely
MR/L: Often at home, Mixed away
MCa: Often
FCd/TM: Rarely
FCa: Mixed

Split Midfield/Attack Forward Runs

I devised these split runs based on observations of the game engine. The AI, in a 4-4-2 formation, always had one central midfielder staying back and one joining the attack. In ’06 I used to have a mixed/often split for home tactics, but this seemed to give the AI too much space in front of the d-line when they countered. Likewise, a rarely/mixed split meant my midfielders through balls were being played from too deep on the park and were being easily intercepted by the AI. Thus, a rarely/often split seemed the way to go and has proved to be highly successful.

The AI does seem to play two forward running forwards. This is one of the reasons that user were struggling to contend with quick counter attacks. Therefore, one of your forwards should at least have forward runs to mixed to offer the AI the same problems. However, it does seem advantageous to have the other FC having forward runs to rarely, as he can then drop deep to pick up balls for the midfield and allow the wingers to get ahead of him. Once he has turned, he then has options to run at the defence or play a through ball to the breaking winger. This seems to create a lot of good scoring opportunities.


Target Man

I would advise the target man to have forward runs set to rarely because he plays with his back to goal. Giving him these settings allows him to win a lot of balls in the air or hold the ball up when played to feet which brings a lot of other players into the game.

Playmaker

Usually operating as a pure AMC, a playmaker should also have forward runs set to rarely. This will allow him to drop deep, pick up the ball and influence the game. If you are playing a flat 4-4-2, it may be worthwhile dropping the forward runs of the MCa to mixed if you wish to employ him as a playmaker.


Time Wasting

I mirror time wasting with the defensive line settings. If you choose the home framework, with the defensive line ranging from 15-19, then time wasting should be set at 5-1. Likewise, as the away framework is designed with frustrating the opposition in mind, time wasting should be at 15-19. The mixed time wasting settings for the attacking away framework work exceptionally well, with players attacking in the last 10 mins when a goal down, but time wasting if they are a goal up. The difference with the away framework is that your players will time waste if the scores are level.


Creative Freedom

Many posts on the forums are of the assumption that the creative freedom slider stops a player from obeying other individual instructions. If it is set high then a player will be more unlikely to do what he is told, if set low then he will adhere to instructions. I believe there are elements of truth to this, but it is not the whole story.

A player on high creative freedom will inevitably look for options in attack as soon as he gets the ball. If he decides that the creative/killer ball is on he will play it. Sometimes it will come off, sometimes it won't. That is the very nature of creativity in all walks of life. If he decides the creative/killer ball is unfeasible, he will play a safe ball and move into position to try again. Hence, decision making is also key to a truly great creative player. A creative player with good decision making will invariably choose the right time to play the right ball. Other factors will influence whether it comes off, such as the defensive stats of the opposition players trying to intercept the ball/tackle the creative player and the off the ball/decision making stats of the player trying to pick up the pass, but on the whole a player with good creativity/decision making will create chances. Alternatively, a player with good creativity/bad decision making will often try to play unfeasibly difficult balls that will result in interceptions and counter attacking moves more often than creating chances for his own team. When setting instructions for such a player, be aware that giving him total freedom will likely result in you losing possession and having to defend quick countering moves as often as getting into scoring positions yourself.

Finally, in terms of creative freedom for the whole team, be careful setting it too high for too many players. If you do this, too many people will be looking for the killer ball, and your truly creative players will have less opportunity to influence a game. Also, too many passes are likely to be intercepted as they are being hit from unfeasible positions on the pitch, and possession will turn over almost the second you have the ball. Tweak it high for a few players, and let the others focus on more mundane tasks, such as defending or scoring goals.

硕鼠

Team Instructions

Use Target Man

This setting works exceedingly well and can create a plethora of chances if used correctly. The archetypal target man, tall, big and strong, can be devastating when set to no forward runs and balls played to head, to feet, or mixed. Obviously, if you want him to run onto ball forward runs are required.

Use Playmaker

A playmaker needs to be in position to pick up easy balls, so giving him high forward runs into attacking zones will lessen his effectiveness. Low or mixed forward runs, low closing down, loose, zonal marking and possibly free role will enable you to get the most out of a playmaker.

Play Offside

Use it in conjunction with a high defensive line, so if the offside trap is beaten your defenders will have time to get back and cover. Thus, it is ideal for the home framework, but less effective for the away ones. Obviously, there is a greater risk in employing it if all your defenders are slow.

Counter Attack

Counter attack is, somewhat ironically, counter intuitive. It does not mean that your players will sprint forward into attacking positions once you get the ball, but rather your players will only launch attacks that are definitely ‘on’. Thus, it is a defensive measure. I use it for all tactics and only turn it off when I come up against tactics in which the opposition is time wasting from the word go. It does mean you won’t see a lot of big wins, but it also guarantees a level of defensive stability that allows your side to grind out one or two nil victories.


Individual Instructions

Run With Ball, Long Shots, Through Balls and Cross Ball

My default set-up, for both home and away tactics, is to have no player doing any of the above instructions more often than mixed. This ensures stability in the tactic as no player gets undone by constantly following the same game plan against an opponent who is better than him. If you are sure your player will be able to heavily influence the game with often instructions because he is obviously better than his marker, then, and only then, turn his relevant instructions to often. When this works it is a joy to behold.

Cross From

Home Tactics: Wingers cross from byline, full-backs from mixed.

Away Tactics: Wingers cross from mixed, full-backs from deep.

Cross Aim

This depends considerably on your tactical set up. If you have a tall, strong target man it can be more than worthwhile aiming to target man. If both strikers are good in the air then mixed is the best option. If one striker is considerably faster than his opponent, aim for him at near post. If both strikers will get constantly beaten to the ball, aim for far post and hope your winger out jumps the opposing full back.

Swap Position

Best used with MCs or FCs. If you have a playmaker MC, the swap position roles will keep him as a playmaker, but sometimes drop him deeper and sometimes play him higher up the pitch. This can pull the opposition around very effectively. Likewise, a target man striker who is also fast can switch between the rare forward runs and mixed forward runs roles and, with balls at mixed, can run riot.

Free Role

Especially effective in conjunction with an AMC playmaker.

Hold Up Ball

This seems to give your team an advantage if set the right way. For a while, in conjunction with others, I was testing tactics with 7 players holding up the ball. This was sound defensively and helped hugely with Rule of Two tactics. However, with the Rule of One framework, a better setting seemed to be having the players operating on the outside and in front of the defence (i.e. full-backs and MCd) holding up the ball, which allowed the team to regain its shape and counter. The target man or FCd should also hold up the ball to allow other players to get in front of him when attacking.


Forward Arrows

I have only experimented with the standard forward arrows on a 4-4-2 tactic i.e. long forward arrows at home, short forward arrows away, and they are very effective. They are basic position aids to help you get players forward or backwards (when employing backward arrows) in order to complement offensive or defensive situations. I’m still reliably informed that side arrowing the forwards when the AI goes to 4-2-4, together with balls played down the flanks, disrupts the AI formation and often results in a goal.


Hypotheticals

I haven’t tested this scenario, but it makes logical sense to me and should work.

Focus Passing

As my frameworks can only operate between a width of three and a width of eighteen due to the pass, tempo, width, MC linking, it seems sensible to divide the focus passing element into three different settings.

Width 3-7: Passing Focus Down the Middle

Width 8-13: Passing Focus Mixed

Width 14-18: Passing Focus Down Both Flanks

Opposition Instructions

I only use these from the start when playing against the Chelsea 4-5-1/4-3-3 system, against which I force the AML and AMR onto the wrong foot. Hypothetically, if you have a good tactical and player quality scout, he will also give you good information on the opposition’s danger man and you can use opposition instructions to snuff out his threat. However, if your scout is dodgy, you may well find you are marking the wrong player out of the game, so be careful at lower levels.

Scouting Knowledge

Many players are having success in preparing instructions that counter the AI manager’s preferred playing style. Thus, if he is high tempo and aggressive, a low tempo, possession game should nullify his tactics. I am unable to verify this as I play on a Mac, and one of the Mac’s idiosyncratic bugs is to inform me that every manager is ‘very cautious’. However, in theory it is a fine idea and could be used to apply pre-game tweaks to your preferred tactic.


Variations

With thanks to The Next Diaby.

I am still using more closing down for FBs (10-14) and it has a great impact on restricting space for opposition wingers.

Another SI winner: forward runs. They are very powerful now, and they allow close to "real-life" setups throughout the whole team! E.g. if using a DMC, forward runs and right instructions can turn your FBs into driving forces for the whole team. Or you can determine if your AMC is a playmaker or a 2nd/3rd striker or if your DMC is an anchorman or deep lying playmaker. Who could ask for more?

I am using forward runs "often" for the strong striker, since I am using a fast target man. I did not see too many offsides that way (most of them are a bit slower anyway...), and the strong striker goes into position, while the fast striker is looking for a position to play the pass/cross or convert on his own.


Man-Management and Media Interaction

Pre-Game Odds and the Media

Getting your interaction with the media wrong pre-game can be catastrophic. If you tell the media that you expect a win with a close odds game, your players are likely to freeze and perform way below expectations. Deal with the media as follows:

Really close odds: No comment

Heavily favoured to win at home: We can win this if we play to our best

Heavily favoured to win away: They could cause us problems

Heavily favoured to lose away: I just want a good performance

Heavily favoured to lose at home: They could cause us problems

This seems to minimize poor player reaction and generally keeps morale levels high.

Pre-Game Team Talks

Generally, the ‘we can win this’ is the best option for home games and the ‘wish luck’ the best for away games. However, the ‘no pressure’ option works well against good sides and the ‘do it for the fans’ against local rivals. I rarely employ the ‘I expect a win option’, preferring the ‘we can win this’ followed by a ‘disappointed’ at half-time if the performance isn’t matching the pre-match odds.

Half-Time Team Talks

When your team has good morale a ‘disappointed’ team talk works wonders at home if your team is performing below expectations. I have used it even when winning but playing less well than I would have wanted and seen an amazing second half performance. As in most away games you would have ‘wished luck’, a ‘we can win this’ if level or losing by one goal often changes the match. If you are winning, then ‘pleased’ does the trick, as it also does with a winning score line and good performance at home. If your morale levels are low, stay away from angry or disappointed comments and focus on encouraging.

Post-Match Team Talks

Generally, be positive post-match. If your team has lost away but played well, be pleased. If they have drawn at home but should have won, be pleased. Only lay into the players if they have performed way below expectations. You will know if you have judged the mood correctly if morale stays high.

硕鼠

A Big Shout to the Following

Sir Bobby Moore: King of the Tactic Pimps and a high-class theoretical contributor. It would be good to see you back on the scene.

Asmodeus: Tactical genius and caustic wit! I hope my evaluation of your Slider Apathy sits well with you.

crazy gra, The Next Diaby, thegooner, supersaint, Beevster Interesting and erudite commentary that forced me to stretch my grey matter and come up with more complete theories and settings.

El Padre For designing the first successful Rule of Two tactic for ’07 and directing a lot of people to my theories.

ntfc & CB&C: Constant support and kind words. Truly appreciated. Quieter than previously, but still around and pointing people in the right direction.

RedefiningForm & Tays: For the Rule of Two and Radius Theory.

Neonlights: For his alternative approach that keeps FM06 fresh for many

Bflaff, smacksim, sjm, Elrawkum(Keith): Intelligent comments and quality posts.

The Old Skool: kennedy, Justified, Buxton, rashidi, Noel: Without you the SI forums would have died long ago.

The Translators: Those that have translated my words into Danish, Polish, Spanish, Dutch, Swedish, Thai & Turkish. For the time, effort and dedication, I salute you.

Cleon: I may not always agree with your theories and definitions, but your dedication to the forums and your patience when dealing with some of the abuse you receive should be commended. It’s a tough job and you do it very well.

FrazT: For the dubious pleasure of trying to direct GQ users to my theories

Saarbrücken, Ikthop: For testing TT&F theories in the ’07 Demo

PAGEY124: For the Rule of One Theory

GarryWHUFC For still not falling out with me after a year of reading and commenting on my articles.

Gaz and all at FM-Britain For the time at effort they put in on a quality site. If it weren’t for you my articles would be less thorough and my motivation to write them less energetic. Promises and deadlines!!!

Everyone that has contributed to TT&F over the last year Thank you all. Your kind words and support are hugely appreciated.